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Abstract 
Although most countries in the world have had a long tradition of craft 
based manufacturing or cottage industries, which arose from the „grass roots”, 
large-scale industrialization did not happen through natural forces except in the 
case of Britain (the first to industrialise). Other countries observed Britain’s 
success, took stock, and planned their industrialization. This was especially 
true in the 20th century, where the Soviet Union, China and India carefully 
planned their industrial development, with a heavy emphasis on planned state 
control, regulation, protectionism and subsidies. Nehru’s famous dictum that 
„It is better to have a second rate thing made in one’s own country than a first 
rate thing one has to import” has served as a role model for most developing 
countries seeking to industrialise.1 This paper provides a critical account on the 
industrialisation and its effects on economic development and growth. We 
argue that the most fundamental assumption underpinning modern industrial 
policy is that the environment, driven by accelerating social, political and 
technological change, is constantly producing new fundamental economic 
opportunities. The paper is based on a number of selected references 
complemented with an extensive additional reading. 
Keywords: Innovation, industrialization, economic development, lessens for 
developing countries  
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Introduction 
Industrialization based on manufacturing is commonly seen as the most 
important route to modernization and economic prosperity. It is easy to see 
why. The Finniston Report2 in 1979, appointed to investigate the changing role 
of engineers in Britain following industrial decline, made a strong case for a 
strong manufacturing sector: 
• Manufacturing accounts for a significant proportion of every nation’s 
economy, and generates a very important proportion of jobs 
• Every sector of the economy has close links with manufacturing either 
through sourcing raw materials, the distribution, marketing and sales of 
goods, or by supplying services, which add value to manufacturing 
processes and products.  
• Employment in non-manufacturing sectors is often dependent on its links 
with manufacturing. In effect manufacturing sustains far more jobs than are 
directly employed by it. 
 
We could add further points: 
• Much of what we eat and most of what we use is „manufactured”. 
Manufacturing apparently underpins all aspects of life. 
• The world’s most powerful countries owe their success to manufacturing 
and industrialization. Britain, a small second rate European power until 
1700, was transformed by being the first country to industrialise. The USA 
was a backwater until its industry „took off” in the 1860s; France, 
Germany and Japan did not reach the status of modern world powers until 
they industrialised in the later 19th Century. In the 20th Century the Soviet 
Union (1920s/30s); India, China and Hong Kong (1950s/60s) achieved 
considerable world influence and power following industrialization. Since 
the war the revival of Germany and Japan into world economic powers is 
commonly ascribed to the modernisation of the manufacturing industrial 
base. 
• Manufacturing is still central to the economies of the world’s wealthiest 
countries. 
• The rate of productivity is higher in manufacturing than services. It thus 
contributes disproportionately to economic growth. 
• Manufactured goods are much more „tradable” than services. Having a 
strong manufacturing „base” is thus important to the balance of payments, 
as manufactured goods are much more exportable and also reduce the 
needs for imports.  
                                                 
2 Sir Montague Finniston (1980), Engineering our Future, Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Engineering Profession: HMSO Cmnd 7794 
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Implicit in these types of discussion is the view that industrialization is 
linked to large scale manufacturing, in which products can be produced in 
volume to meet mass consumer demand. Large manufacturing organizations in 
turn produce multiplier effects supporting a large sub-structure of dependent 
suppliers, distributors and service providers. Despite major differences in how 
modes of productions were controlled, regulated and distributed, both 
communist and capitalist countries ended up with large „Fordist” types of 
industrial production units. As Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers (1960:p.39)3 
put it in their seminal book „Industrialism and Industrial man”, „the 
technology and specialisation of the industrial society are necessarily and 
distinctly associated with large scale organizations, which require extensive 
coordination of managers and managed”.  
Although most countries in the world have had a long tradition of craft 
based manufacturing or cottage industries, which arose from the „grass roots”, 
large-scale industrialization did not happen through natural forces except in the 
case of Britain (the first to industrialise). Other countries observed Britain’s 
success, took stock, and planned their industrialization. This was especially 
true in the 20th century, where the Soviet Union, China and India carefully 
planned their industrial development, with a heavy emphasis on planned state 
control, regulation, protectionism and subsidies. Nehru’s famous dictum that 
„It is better to have a second rate thing made in one’s own country than a first 
rate thing one has to import” has served as a role model for most developing 
countries seeking to industrialise.4 Restrictions of imports into Kenya, and 
import substitution policies, for example, were a keystone in the partial 
industrialization of Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s.  By the 1980s, however, 
India gained a reputation as a country where everything ALMOST works, and 
Kenya produced many items that were available but not always willingly 
consumed. I can still clearly visualise the sickly taste and garish Technicolor 
red of the Kenya tomato ketchup import substitute of the 1960s. Clearly this 
model has its disadvantages. 
Industrialization in the new Millennium. 
The limitations and weaknesses of the traditional model of 
industrialization have been evident since the 1970s. The following factors have 
necessitated a radical reappraisal of the role of manufacturing in the modern 
world: 
                                                 
3 Kerr et al. (1960s), Industrialization and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour and 
Management in Economic Growth. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
4 Тhe Economist (US) June 5th 2001 
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• Increases in productivity made possible by the advent new technology. 
Most modern factories have become so efficient as a result of 
mechanisation that they require only a fraction of people to work in them.  
• The exponential rate of increase of the rate of innovations5. For example in 
the world of computing alone, processing power has been doubling every 
two years since the 1980s, and the added commercial value of the internet 
has been exponential since 19936. If you think about it most luxury 
consumer goods we take for granted did not exist commercially before 
1940 (television, tape and video recorders, CDs, DVDs, mobile phones, 
food processors, PCs, laptops, coffee making machines).  
• Globalisation: thanks to rapid communications and transport, global 
competition becomes normal rather than exceptional.  
• Differentiation of consumer tastes: The increasing sophistication of people 
has led to demand for more choice and customisation. Demand is much 
more volatile and unpredictable. Mass markets have been transformed into 
segmented niche markets. 7 
 
These factors have led to a revolution in the nature of industrial 
organizations: 
• The large complex hierarchical Fordist organization is increasingly 
obsolete. Technological efficiency and differentiation of consumer tastes 
have made short runs more economical and have eroded the advantages of 
gains in productivity linked to economies of scale. This has tended to 
favour smaller production units. There has been a large growth in small 
businesses throughout the world in the last thirty years servicing „niche” 
markets, and a downsizing of large traditional manufacturing plants. 
• The need for choice has led to frequent innovative variations on core 
products, making them „socially” redundant well before they become 
functionally redundant. (Although my Sony Laptop is less than 9 months 
old, for example, and still works perfectly, I am already hankering for the 
latest one with new advanced features). 
• There is less advantage in geographical concentration. Sub units can be 
spread widely without incurring penal costs. 
• Innovation and automation has led to less need for labour, especially 
traditional skilled labour. The unpredictability of the nature and size of new 
                                                 
5 P. Drucker, Managing in a Time of Great Change, Butterworth, 1999- 
6 A fuller discussioin of these pehenomena known as Moore’s Law and Metcalfes’ Law can be 
found in Papows, J. (1999)  Enterprise.com. Nicholas Brearlley 
7 G. Loveman; W. Sengenberger, Economic and social reorganisation in the small and medium-
sized enterprise sector” in Sengenberger et al. (1990) The Re-emergence of Small Enterprises: 
Industrial Restructuring in Industrialised Countries, Geneva:ILO, 1990. 
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markets and the decreasing lifetime of products has generated a new need 
for a flexible and adaptable labour force. There is an increasing trend for 
expertise to be bought in when needed, burgeoning a growth in sub-
contracted self-employed service providers. 
The industrialization paradox: 
Modern industrial economies, particularly the most prosperous ones, 
have experienced a considerable trauma since the 1960s as the forces of change 
swept over them. There has been an enormous shake out of large traditional 
„smoke stack” manufacturing industries. Britain, for example, has suffered 
many famous casualties. The motorcycle industry disappeared in 1960s; 
commercial shipbuilding is now virtually extinct; a few small designer car 
firms still manufacture in Britain, but British owned mass car production is 
virtually dead. Textiles have mostly gone too. In my village of Alva in 
Scotland only one Woollen Mill remains out of over a dozen operating in the 
1960s. This is only viable because it services passing tourists. 
Yet, paradoxically, manufacturing still survives and is, if anything, 
richer than ever. The profits generated by modern food processing and 
pharmaceutical companies, for example, is still enormous. Manufacturing 
industries are still vital in the economies of nations such as Japan and 
Germany, the USA and Britain. What is going on? 
• Firstly there have been huge gains in productivity as a result of new 
technology and mechanization. Fewer people are being employed, but 
output and profits are much greater. IMF figures show that the share of 
manufacturing in total employment in the rich economies fell from 28% in 
1970 to 18% in 1994. Even in Japan, one of the strongest manufacturing 
economies, less than a third of employment is in manufacturing. 
Productivity in manufacturing has risen twice as fast as in services, making 
it more profitable but less labour intensive.  
• Globalisation, coupled with the growing liberalisation of trade, has 
realigned global competitiveness. One commonly held view is that this 
favours developing countries, as they have advantages of low labour costs 
and can take advantage of „migrating” companies. Closer scrutiny, 
however, reveals that the gains are not high in terms of quality of jobs and 
life, and that even these gains are relatively short lived. Even India and the 
Asian Tigers have been experiencing rapid reductions in manufacturing 
employment as productivity through innovation displaces gains from 
cheapness of labour. 
 
Porter states in a number of papers in the Harvard Business Review, that 
national prosperity is created, not inherited. It does not grow out of a country’s 
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natural endowments, its labour pool, its interest rate, and its currency value as 
classical economists insist. Globalisation has wiped out these traditional 
advantages. The key factors of production today – technology, intellectual and 
financial capital, managerial skill – are not rooted in a nation’s soil but are 
eminently transportable across borders. The advent of the Internet has 
accelerated this process of freedom from national boundaries. 
Why then are there still regional industrial „clusters” of manufacturing 
excellence (high performance autos in Germany and Northern Italy; cameras in 
Germany and Japan; play stations in Japan; internet search engines in 
California and so on)? Porter argues that theoretically these clusters ought to be 
dispersing under globalisation. However what appears to be happening is that 
when businesses of the same type are clustered together, they generate local 
rivalries, which stimulates innovation and excellence. Research on Silicon 
Valley8 has also demonstrated that whilst at one level firms compete with each 
other in the global market place (Yahoo versus Lycos, for example, or BMW 
and Mercedes), they also share common networks and frequently interchange 
specialised talent. (For example in the UK Premier League, all the teams 
compete, but players, coaches and managers rotate often between clubs). 
Innovation, managerial expertise and knowledge drive modern companies, not 
traditional and simplistic notions of comparative advantage. 
Unravelling the assumptions of industrialisation and economic 
growth 
Modern industrial economies in the rich countries are much more 
sophisticated than the economies of the traditional industrial era pre-dating 
1980. What options do developing countries have in trying to match these 
sophisticated trends? In order to discuss this question, it is necessary first to 
understand that the basic assumptions underlying economic growth have 
fundamentally shifted in the last forty years. 
As Figure 1 shows, the most fundamental assumption underpinning 
modern industrial policy is that the environment, driven by accelerating social, 
political and (primarily) technological change, is constantly producing new 
fundamental business opportunities. The pace of new technologies and 
business opportunities takes little imagination to verify. The gramophone, for 
example, was invented in the late 19th century, a huge head with a needle 
playing a vinyl grove. Fifty years later this basic model was replaced by an 
electrical record player still based on a needle running along a groove, but now 
linked electronically to loudspeakers. By 1965 reel-to-reel tapes had begun to 
                                                 
8 A. Saxenian, (1996) Regional Advantage, Culture and Competition in Silicin Valley and Route 
128, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
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challenge this model of producing music. By 1970 portable cassettes had 
become the vogue. They were superseded by CDs in the late 1970s, and we 
now have digital media. The lead-time between fundamental changes, as 
Druker observes,9 is getting shorter and shorter. Each one of these fundamental 
changes had significant multiplier effects. 
 
What if the assumption is false, that new opportunities are few and slow 
to materialise? We would then have a steady state economy, similar to the one 
before the war, where the „world cake” was finite and slow to expand. Such 
expansion would mostly have occurred as a result of population growth, rather 
than increased demand through changing consumer tastes. Figure 2 illustrates 
the implications of this. With a relatively static „zero growth” „cake” with slow 
changing mass markets, increased profits can only come by displacing the 
profits of others. Left to market forces those companies that are best able to 
compete would get bigger and more dominant at the expense of less successful 
companies. The role of innovation of production would be to accelerate this 
process. As a company becomes more efficient through modernization and 
innovation, its capacity to displace other companies is even greater. It is a 
recipe for the growth of monopolistic giant companies. 
In this kind of economic climate, nations with few competitive 
advantages for their companies would have little choice but to either survive on 
the „crumbs” left by the cake when it is cut up, or to generate some kind of 
competitive advantage artificially. Developing countries like India and China 
through government planning, protectionism, subsidies and incentives were 
able to build up in the post war period internal industries by isolating their 
                                                 
9 P. Drucker, (1985) Innovation and Entrepreneurship, London: Butterworth/Heineman 
 
F ig . 1 : Im p lica t io n s o f in n o v ation  a n d  ch an ge  
to  p o licy  ap p ro ach es  to  in d u str ia lisa tio n
A S S U M P T IO N
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country from the winds of market forces. When India finally rejoined the main 
economy in 1990, it had to endure as radical a transformation as that 
experienced by any of the developed economies. 
This „Route Zero” option, however, is increasingly out of step with 
modern conditions, chiefly because new opportunities are developing 
frequently and rapidly in the modern economy. The assumption that 
opportunities are out stepping the ability of entrepreneurs in industry to take 
advantage of them is widely accepted, by governments of all political 
persuasions. The main area of debate today is not so much whether such 
opportunities exist, but HOW best to exploit and optimise them. In Figure 1 
modern governments have commonly adopted two routes to success. ROUTE 
ONE is the „Laissez Faire” or market forces route, championed particularly by 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. ROUTE TWO is the 
planned interventionist route, which has been favoured particularly by more 
socialist governments (of which the current UK government is a typical 
example). 
An important difference between these two approaches lies in their belief 
on whether wealth and job creating opportunities can be predicted. In ROUTE 
ONE it is assumed that governments cannot predict the best money making 
opportunities. Market forces are the most efficient way of matching resources 
to opportunities, and they should be given free reign to operate. It does not 
 
Fig. 2: ROUTE ZERO IMPLICATIONS
•There is slow predictable growth in demand- mainly from increases in population
• New profits mainly come from exploiting existing markets more efficiently
• Favours growth of large and established firms with increasingly competitive   
resources and managerial expertise
• Increased profits are largely at the expense of other less competitive businesses
IF THERE FEW NEW OPPORTUNITIES BEING GENERATED
Leaving the economy to market 
forces will favour success for those 
with genuine competitive advantage 
– and will drive less competitive 
companies to extinction.  Policy has 
favoured maximising the genuine 
competitive advantages of 
companies. (Making the 
environment more competitive, free 
trade). 
If genuine competitive advantage is 
lacking or in short supply, policy  has 
favoured manufacturing advantage 
(protectionism, subsidies etc.).  This is a 
very tempting route for developing 
countries with few perceived competitive 
advantages.
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matter in the end which industrial sector a job comes from, as long as the job is 
generated by a genuinely profitable business. Entrepreneurs are thus the best 
people to find and pursue new opportunities. 
In ROUTE TWO, however, there is an underlying suspicion about 
uncontrolled entrepreneurship. The best jobs and market opportunities, it is 
believed, can be predicted in advance, and can be planned and controlled. In 
particular there are „jobs and jobs”, quality of jobs matter as much as quantity 
of jobs. The sources for quality jobs can also be predicted and planned for. The 
approach relies on „picking winners” and „picking sectors”. At present the 
current UK government, and most European governments, agree that the most 
promising sectors are high technology „knowledge based „ sectors.10 
                                                 
10 The OECD definition of knowledge based industries is given below as quoted by the UK 1998 
White Paper „Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy:Analytical 
Report 3.2.3: (CM1250).” www.dti.gov.uk/comp/competitive/ 
• Knowledge based industries: knowledge based services and high tech industry. 
• Knowledge based services: telecommunications; computer and information services; 
finance; insurance; royalties; other business services.  
• High technology industries: aerospace; computers and office equipment; radio, TV 
and communications equipment; pharmaceuticals. Medium - high technology 
industries: professional goods; motor vehicles; electrical machines excluding 
FIG. 3 Underpinning assumptions: Routes One &Two
ROUTE ONE
“Laissez Faire” Minimal 
Intervention Model
UNDERPINNING ASSUMPTION- ROUTES One & Two
There are far more opportunities that are being created by innovation and 
change than are being exploited by entrepreneurs, intrapreneurs or corporate 
entrepreneurs
UNDERPINNING ASSUMPTION 
Free market is the best mechanism 
for matching opportunities to 
resources. OPPORTUNITIES 
CANNOT BE PREDICTED
ROUTE TWO
Planned Targeted Intervention 
Model
UNDERPINNING ASSUMPTION
The best opportunities are 
concentrated in a few high growth 
innovative sectors (e.g. high 
technology manufacturing, software, 
new knowledge etc). OPPORTUNITIES 
CAN BE PREDICTED
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The consequences of these assumptions to government policy are 
outlined in Figure 4. In ROUTE ONE, to maximise the take-up of 
opportunities, it is necessary to have as many entrepreneurs, intrapreneurs or 
corporate entrepreneurs as possible trying out new business ideas. As the 
source of the next great business is not very predictable, the economy needs a 
diversity of entrepreneurs (from different backgrounds, expertise and 
experiences) to try their luck. As entrepreneurs experiment with opportunities, 
a natural selection process occurs. From the „churn” of entrepreneurial activity, 
the fittest survive, and send up strong innovative and vigorous new businesses. 
This means that a competitive business environment is essential, and that the 
government must tolerate (and control the social consequences) of high rates of 
business failure. Reynolds and Maki (1990)11 in a regional study of US 
                                                                                                                      
communications equipment; chemical excluding drugs; other transport; non-electrical 
machinery.  
• Medium - low technology industries: rubber and plastic products; ship-building and 
repairing; other manufacturing; non-ferrous metals; non-metallic mineral products; 
metal products; petroleum refineries and products; ferrous metals.  
• Low technology industries: paper, products and printing; textiles, apparel and leather; 
food, beverages and tobacco; wood products and furniture. 
11 Reynolds P.; W.R. Maki, ‘Business Volatilty and Growth’ Report to the US Small Business 
Administration, Regional Economic Development Associates, Minneapolis, 1990. 
 
Fig. 4: Optimising the potential of each route
ROUTE ONE: Metaphor
“Survival of the fittest”
To maximise unpredictable 
opportunities, as many entrepreneurs 
as possible should experiment with 
new diversifications. Hence policy 
should:
- Encourage high rates of new firm 
formation
- Tolerate high rates of business 
failure and “churn”
- Ensure a fair and uninhibited 
competitive business environment  
OUTCOME: Vigorous, entrepreneurial 
tough competitive new companies. 
WEEDS?
ROUTE TWO: Metaphor
“Gardening”
To maximise predictable opportunities in high 
growth innovative sectors businesses have 
to be nurtured, as they are difficult to start 
and need a great deal of investment (they are 
resource and knowledge intensive). Hence 
Policy needs to :
- Persuade entrepreneurs to start 
businesses in these difficult sectors
- Train entrepreneurs and staff to operate 
effectively in such knowledge intensive 
industries
- Encourage  preferential LONG-TERM 
investment in these sectors. Government 
has a vital role to play in underpinning risk 
as the free market will be wary.
OUTCOME: Fragile specialist innovative 
companies: FRUIT?
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businesses showed that the most prosperous regions of the USA were 
associated not only with high rates of business births, but also high rates of 
business „deaths”. This implies a Darwinian evolutionary process where the 
fittest survive, and where competitive forces match opportunities through 
entrepreneurial experimentation. 
 
Reynolds and Maki (1990:90-91) stated: 
 
“The most important finding for public policy was the importance of 
high establishment and job birth and death rates to economic growth. This was 
so pervasive that the analysis proceeded by combining both death and birth 
measures as indications of business establishment and job volatility. This was 
strong evidence that the process of economic change requires a substantial 
transfer of resources (capital, facilities, entrepreneurial and managerial talent) 
from one firm to another and from one industry to another. Public policies that 
attempt to prevent such shifts by subsidising organisations and industries in 
decline may not only support non-competitive activities, they may retard the 
development of more promising activities. An adaptive economic system seems 
to require a substantial degree of volatility – business births and deaths, jobs 
created and destroyed. The most suitable role for governments may be to 
facilitate adaptation of the economic system through changes in businesses 
entities and jobs whilst minimising the social costs – interim unemployment, 
redeployment of capital and physical assets – associated with such 
transactions” 
 
Contrast this with the planned interventionist approach of ROUTE TWO 
in Figure 4. The emphasis is on „picking winners”. Having targeted high 
growth sectors, new businesses in these sectors have to be „nurtured”. 
Entrepreneurs with the right skills (a scarce resource) have to be tempted to 
commercialise, and start businesses within these sectors. A great deal of 
investment has to be spent on the fledgling business, as the pay-off may not 
materialise for several years. Investment is long-term, and hence risky. Unlike 
in the competitive approach, moreover, the interventionists see little merit in 
business failure. Having spent so much investment in getting these businesses 
off the ground, failure is costly. 
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In terms of process and outcome, each approach can be viewed 
metaphorically in terms of gardening . The free market ROUTE ONE approach 
requires no intervention by the gardener, and generates through competition 
and survival of the fittest, strong vigorous plants (Weeds?). The interventionist 
ROUTE TWO approach in contrast requires significant gardening as the 
„young shoots” would be swamped, left to their own devices. After careful 
nurturing and gardening, however, they produce high value and productive 
fruit. 
Both routes are critically affected by limitations in the supply of human 
capital (Figure 5). For ROUTE ONE to work well, a plentiful supply of 
entrepreneurs is needed. As opportunities could come from many different and 
unpredictable sources, the economy needs a diversity of entrepreneurs, with 
different skills, backgrounds and experience. To achieve this the Thatcher’s 
government adopted a number of measures to encourage more entrepreneurs 
„to have a go”. This was mainly done through the tax system, by which self-
employed people were permitted to offset a much greater range of expenses 
against tax than employed people. They became aware that once in business, 
they could keep a much greater proportion of earnings. At the same time 
employment was made less attractive by measures designed to erode 
permanency in employment. A large proportion of the working population was 
Fig 5: Remedies for supply imperfections
ROUTE ONE
• Promote a plentiful supply of 
entrepreneurs to test out new 
unpredictable opportunities.  Encourage 
diversity of skills and background and 
an enterprise culture to persuade people 
to have a go.
• Fair access to resources (capital, labour, 
advice, support). Advice and support 
should be made available (at a fee) but 
not “forced”.
• Promote a flexible and mobile labour 
force capable of adapting quickly to 
changing conditions.  (Discourage 
permanent employment, make 
retraining available, abolish restrictive 
working practices)
ROUTE TWO
• Promote a specialist supply of high 
technology entrepreneurs (especially by 
targeting science departments of 
research universities). Train them to 
commercialise innovation.
• Encourage partnerships between 
innovators, government, business, 
banks  and venture capital funders to 
provide resources.
• Investment in education and training to 
provide the high growth sectors with a 
skilled labour force.
• Instil progressive attitudes in people
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in shorter term contracts by the end of the 1980s. Secondly they encouraged an 
enterprise culture, in which self reliance and making money through business 
were constantly praised. Finally, the tries to liberate regulations at all levels, to 
make it easier and cheaper to start businesses. 
In contrast, for ROUTE TWO to become effective, entrepreneurs need to 
be knowledgeable and specialised in the targeted high technology sectors. Such 
people tend to be in short supply. The current UK government is championing 
Route Two policies, and since 1998 has targeted Universities for special 
attention in its drive to find new „knowledge-based” entrepreneurs.12 Any 
scientist who wishes to start a business based on the commercialisation of his 
or her scientific work is guaranteed plenty of support in terms of grants, 
subsidies, specialist advice and mentoring. 
Furthermore as starting new high knowledge businesses is a risky 
process that requires high initial investment, the complexity and difficulty of 
this process has been recognised as a crucial barrier. It is now assumed that 
though the high technology or knowledge specialist entrepreneur is the focus of 
the business, he or she cannot operate alone. There is thus a focus on fostering 
„partnerships” between governments, the Universities or other knowledge 
based institution, the knowledge entrepreneur, other industrial experts and 
financiers (banks, venture capitalists). In this way different skills are blended 
lessening the risk and increasing the chances of success. 
Both approaches also require the right kind of labour force to work well. 
In ROUTE ONE the primary requirement for management and employees is 
the ability to adapt to change and learn new learn new skills quickly, as new 
types of business opportunities are experimented with. In ROUTE TWO, 
however, skills can be predicted in advance and planned for. It is assumed that 
setting up businesses in high technology and other knowledge based sectors 
requires a labour force with special skills. A shortage of such people would 
slow down the development of the knowledge based economy. To remedy this 
requires strategic educational and training planning. The UK governments of 
the last ten years have tried to remedy these kinds of shortages by changing the 
higher education system. In the traditional industrial economy when factories 
dominated, Britain needed an elite professional and managerial class (the best 
educated 3-6% went to University to become professionals) a large class of 
skilled industrial workers (trained through apprenticeships, colleges and 
polytechnics) and a large class of manual workers (learning on the job). In the 
new knowledge economy most of these traditional skills are now redundant. To 
instil the new skills needed, Britain now needs a flexible and well educated 
                                                 
12 UK Government: Department of Trade and Industry (2001), Excellence and Opportunity, A 
Science and Innovation Policy for the 21st Century, (CM 4814),   
www.dti.gov.uk/ost/aboutost/dtiwhite 
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majority of employees. The current Blair government has set a target of 50 per 
cent of school leavers becoming University educated by 2005. This is a large 
long term investment in education for what is often refered to as „Britain 
PLC”. 
It should be noted that a ROUTE ONE approach also favours education, 
but for different reasons. Education in the ROUTE ONE approach is not there 
to provide skills for knowledge driven companies, but to expand people’s skills 
and minds so that they become better aware of global business opportunities 
and have the capability and confidence to pursue them. 
What are the options for developing countries? 
The modern innovative and knowledge based economy produces: 
a) Highly innovative, productive, flexible and efficient manufacturing which 
requires less employees 
b) A large number of dependent suppliers and services to these units 
c) A proliferation of small niche producers and service providers to cater for 
an increasing diversity of consumer tastes and demand 
d) Mechanisms to allow global penetration of even smaller markets (notably 
through the world wide web) 
e) A proliferation of new and widespread opportunities in a diversity of 
sectors 
 
All countries have elements of the new economy in them. Even India, 
whose economy is a product of planned traditional industrialization, has been 
heavily affected by the new economic order and, having experiences economic 
liberalisation, has seized opportunities.  As a recent article in the Economist 
puts it: 
“[In India] services are growing faster than any other sector. They span 
a range from banks to tea stalls, but it is the ‘knowledge industries’ that have 
captured the imagination of India’s entrepreneurs. Of these, information 
technology is the most successful. It has grown at an average annual rate of 
over 50% from almost nothing in 1991 to sales of $8.3 billion in 2000 and 
employment of around 400,000. It makes up 15% of India’s exports. 
NASSCOM, the main trade association for the information technology industry, 
predicts that by 2008 India will export $50 billion-worth of software and allied 
services and employ 1.1 million people.” (Economist (US) 2001, June 2). 
 
How can these opportunities be realised in poorer developing countries? 
The old formula of traditional industrialization (which I called ROUTE ZERO 
earlier), clearly has a lot of problems if implemented. In the competitive 
modern economy, only cheap labour provides a true advantage for the poorest 
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developing countries, but this is of limited value, as modern manufacturing 
needs cheap skilled labour, not cheap uneducated labour. Moreover if 
education improves, the cheap competitive advantage soon disappears, as the 
Asian Tiger countries are now experiencing. If developing countries decide to 
create artificial competitive advantages for their own industries through 
protectionism, subsidies and planned traditional industrialization, this would be 
even more problematic in the long term, as is witnessed by the demise of 
traditional industries world wide once subjected to the competitive pressures of 
global market forces. The lesson to be learnt her, perhaps, is that those 
countries that have not industrialised significantly in a traditional manner (like 
most African countries, for instance) should „leap frog” this stage. An analogy 
for this is telephones. In Uganda landlines were not upgraded or modernised 
during the troubles of the 1970s and early 1980s. In the meantime the new 
generation of communications (mobile phones) has taken off. We could say 
that Uganda has „leap frogged” the landline stage. 
How then can a modern industrial economy emerge by „leap-frogging” 
the development of traditional manufacturing? ROUTE ONE (leave it to the 
market) is highly effective in matching perceived opportunities to resources. It 
is the basis of all healthy economies. However, it could be argued that in the 
poorest developing countries, only a small proportion of elite cosmopolitans 
have the education and wide experience to access the proliferation of global 
opportunities being thrown up by innovation and change. You have a situation 
where a limited number of elite entrepreneurs are making a great deal of money 
and are global in their vision and operation, and provide opportunities for a 
large number of smaller suppliers and service providers. The bulk of the 
population, however, though often equally entrepreneurial, operates only at a 
local level within the informal sector, and fails to reach out to more global 
opportunities. There is no failure of market forces here. It is rather that market 
forces are only partially operating in a global environment, and hence only 
accessing a limited number of possible modern opportunities. 
ROUTE TWO provides a possible remedy to increase involvement in the 
global economy. This requires a strong role by government and industry to 
develop knowledge that can be commercialised in the Universities and research 
departments of industry. ROUTE TWO solutions can be locally very effective 
(for example the French government has been very successful in developing 
high technology industry clusters through careful intervention. Closer scrutiny, 
however, reveals that ROUTE TWO solutions are so complex and expensive 
that they can only be applied to a small number of sectors and only by rich 
countries. The bulk of the economy BY DEFAULT must remain driven by 
ROUTE ONE principles. ROUTE TWO also suffers from the fact that trying to 
guess which sectors will produce the best businesses does not always work. 
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How can ROUTE ONE solutions be made more effective in developing 
countries? The long-term answer is to invest in more higher education, and for 
entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs to travel more. Once personal horizons 
are opened up, entrepreneurial people will be able to spot more global 
opportunities, and also have more knowledge to enable them to bid for the 
necessary resources to exploit them. An expansion of higher education, as in 
the UK, is a vital long-term investment which government must play a major 
part in engineering. (By this I mean that government must see that it 
materialises, but does not necessarily imply that government is the best 
provider). In the short-term the encouragement of our current cohort of elite 
global entrepreneurs remains one of our major weapons to develop new market 
opportunities. Making it easier for them to operate is an essential step to 
establish a new industrial economy. 
In this paper we have presented an analysis of how the new industrial 
economies differ from the traditional one based on large-scale manufacturing. 
We also discussed the strengths and weakness of two approaches for 
developing the opportunities presented by the new innovation driven and 
knowledge based economies. We finally introduced some thoughts on the 
implications of these approaches to developing countries. 
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